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SYMPOSIUM:
DOPING IN SPORTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES

FEDERAL LABOR LAW OBSTACLES TO
ACHIEVING A COMPLETELY
INDEPENDENT DRUG PROGRAM IN MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL
ROBERT D. MANFRED, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The war against the illegal use of anabolic androgenic steroids and other
performance enhancing substances in sports has piqued the interest of millions
around the globe. Even the President of the United States called on the sports
industry to "get rid of steroids" in his 2004 State of the Union Address.'
Congress followed suit by introducing six bills, each proposing to establish
minimum drug standards for professional sports leagues and mandatory
random testing for their athletes. 2 However, congressional legislation has
proven unnecessary as Major League Baseball (MLB) and the Major League
Baseball Players Association (Players Association) (collectively, the "Parties")
have made tremendous progress in strengthening the sport's Joint Drug
Prevention and Treatment Program (Joint Drug Program). Indeed, MLB now
Executive Vice President of Labor and Human Resources, Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Steven P. Gonzalez, Counsel, Labor
Relations for the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball and Jason B. Jendrewski, Intern, Labor
Relations for the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball in the preparation of this article.
1. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
2. See Brent D. Showalter, Comment, Steroid Testing Policies in ProfessionalSports: Regulated
By Congress or the Responsibility of the Leagues?, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 651, 653 n. 13, 660-63
(2007) (summarizing the following bills: Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. (2005);
Clean Sports Act of 2005, H.R. 2565, 109th Cong. (superseded by H.R. 1862); Professional Sports
Integrity Act of 2005, H.R. 2516, 109th Cong.; Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong.
(companion bill to H.R. 2565); the Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005);
and the Professional Sports Responsibility and Accountability Act, S. 1334, 109th Cong. (2005)).
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has the strongest drug program of any major professional sports league in the
United States 3 and, perhaps more importantly, MLB has a drug program that
will protect the integrity of the game.
On December 13, 2007, former Senator George J. Mitchell released his
much anticipated Report to the Commissioner of Baseball of an Independent
Investigation into the Illegal Use of Steroids and Other Performance
Enhancing Substances by Players in Major League Baseball (Mitchell
Report). 4 In Section XI of the Mitchell Report, the Senator set forth a series
5
of recommendations for further improvement of the Joint Drug Program.
Many of Senator Mitchell's recommendations - e.g., forming a Department of
Investigations, conducting random drug testing and background checks of
clubhouse personnel, requiring club employees to disclose any knowledge of
use, possession, or distribution of any Prohibited Substance, creating a hotline
for reporting violations of the Joint Drug Program, and logging all incoming
packages sent to clubhouses at Major League ballparks - lent themselves to
unilateral implementation by the Commissioner and, in fact, were so
implemented. 6 The remaining recommendations were subject to the collective
bargaining process and required negotiation with the Players Association. One
such recommendation was that the Joint Drug Program be "administered by a
7
truly independent authority."
Despite occupying only three short paragraphs within the 409-page report,
Senator Mitchell's recommendation that the Joint Drug Program be
independent is a particularly significant one. Specifically, Senator Mitchell
stated that "the independent program administrator should hold exclusive
authority over all aspects of the formulation and administration of the
program." 8 In his statement before the House of Representatives Committee
3. Commissioner Allen H. (Bud) Selig stated that "[b]aseball currently has the most aggressive
drug program in professional sports, banning steroids, amphetamines, and human growth hormone,
and imposing the stiffest penalties for use." Press Release, Major League Baseball, Commissioner's
Statement (Dec.
13,
2007), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/press-releases/press-release.jsp?ymd=
20071213&content-id=2325226&vkey=pr__mlb&fext=-.jsp&c-id=mlb.
The other sports leagues
referred to are the National Football League, the National Basketball Association, and the National
Hockey League.
4. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL OF AN INDEPENDENT
INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING

SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (Dec. 13, 2007) [hereinafter MITCHELL
REPORT], availableat http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/news/mitchell/index.jsp.

5. See Id. at 285-309.
6. See Press Release, Major League Baseball, Major League Baseball Acts on Mitchell
=
Recommendations (Jan. 7, 2008), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/press-releases/press-release.jsp?ymd
20080107&contentid=2341094&vkey=pr mlb&fext-.jsp&cid-mlb.
7. MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 4, at SR-24.

8. Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
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on Oversight and Government Reform on January 15, 2008, Senator Mitchell
reiterated that "[t]he program should be administered by a truly independent
9
authority that holds exclusive authority over its structure and administration."
Thus, Senator Mitchell's definition of independence includes not only
administering, but also establishing and modifying the terms of the Joint Drug
Program.
In response to Senator Mitchell's recommendation, the Parties made major
strides in the area of independence by delegating administrative authority to an
Independent Program Administrator. However, Senator Mitchell's goal of a
completely independent drug program - in terms of both formulation and
administration - is virtually impossible to achieve in the context of the
federally governed labor-management relationship. Although the World AntiDoping Agency l° (WADA) on occasion has criticized the legitimacy of drug
testing programs in North American professional sports, 1I the reality is that
the permanent delegation of the authority to formulate a drug program to a
person or persons independent of the bargaining parties is flatly inconsistent
with the policy of free collective bargaining which is embedded in the federal
labor laws and which has been the principle vehicle for promoting industrial
stability in the United States since 1935.
As discussed in Part II of this article, unlike governing bodies for amateur
sports (such as the International Olympic Committee), which have the ability
to unilaterally establish and impose the terms of their drug testing programs,
MLB (like the other major professional sports leagues in the United States)
operates in a unionized environment subject to the strictures of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 12 As will be discussed more fully below, there
9. The Mitchell Report: The Illegal Use of Steroids in Major League Baseball: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 26 (2008) (statement of George J. Mitchell).
10. The World Anti-Doping Agency was established pursuant to the Lausanne Declaration on
Doping in Sport on November 10, 1999 to promote and coordinate the global fight against doping in
sports. In 2004, WADA created the World Anti-Doping Code, which contains a list of substances
and methods prohibited in sports. See World Anti-Doping Agency, WADA History, WADAAMA.ORG, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=
253 (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
11. See A.J. Perez, Anti-Doping Leader Sure of Beijing Games' Testing Program,USA TODAY,
July 31, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/beijing/2008-07-31-wadachief-testing-program_N.htm.
12. In MLB, the Parties negotiated their first collective bargaining agreement in 1968, and, the
following year, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) formally accepted jurisdiction over the
sport. See American League of Professional Baseball Clubs & Association of National Baseball
League Umpires, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969). The NLRB declared that professional baseball is an
industry "in or affecting commerce, and as such is subject to NLRB jurisdiction under the Act." Id. at
192. Consequently, MLB is bound by the requirements of the NLRA with respect to its employment
of Major League players.
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is a stark difference between implementing a comprehensive drug program in
a private unionized environment, as opposed to one that affects only nonunionized amateur athletes because important labor policies applicable to
broad segments of the economy are implicated. 13
II. UNITED STATES LABOR LAW OBSTACLES TO ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE
WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT DRUG PROGRAM

The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), amended in
1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act and in 1959 by the Landrum-Griffin Act,
established the legal framework for private sector labor relations in the United
States and created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), an
independent federal agency, to administer the law. 14 Most notably, the
Wagner Act grants employees "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining."1 5 To safeguard these statutory rights, the NLRB is
charged with ensuring employees' free choice concerning union representation
and preventing and remedying unfair labor practices. 16
The policies underlying the NLRA have played an important role in the
industrial and economic development of the United States. By creating a form
of limited employee self-determination in the process of collective bargaining,
the NLRA has served to limit costly industrial strife in the form of strikes and
lockouts. 17 Moreover, the NLRA is premised on the notion that the
bargaining parties, as opposed to an outside agency, are best situated to

13. "In major professional sports leagues in the United States, athletes are represented in
collective bargaining by players associations. Under federal law, drug testing is a subject of
collective bargaining and, in this context, requires the agreement of the players associations. That is
not the case with the Olympics or other traditionally amateur sports; there the governing bodies may
unilaterally impose any program of their choice." MITCHELL REPORT, supranote 4, at SR-13 n.8.
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2008).
15. Id. § 157. Collective bargaining is the process of negotiating a contract between an employer
and a labor organization. The resulting agreement is known as a collective bargaining agreement and
governs the employment relationship between the parties. The NLRA applies to nearly all private
employers engaged in interstate commerce with the exception of the railroad and airline industries,
which are governed by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (2008).
16. See National Labor Relations Board, Fact Sheet, NLRB.GOv, http://www.nlrb.gov/
AboutUs/Overview/factsheet.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2008); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 159-61

(2008).
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 151. See also First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981).
"A fundamental aim of the National Labor Relations Act is the establishment and maintenance of
industrial peace to preserve the flow of interstate commerce." Id.
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develop practical solutions to workplace problems and disputes. 18
As a policy matter, the NLRA encourages negotiation between employers
and employee representatives, and accordingly, the statute imposes a
reciprocal duty on employers and unions to bargain in good faith - that is, to
negotiate with the intent of reaching an agreement. 19 Indeed, under Section
158(d), both sides are expressly required "to meet at reasonable times and
'20
confer in good faith with respect to ... the negotiation of an agreement."
Specifically, the good faith bargaining obligation extends to the so-called
"mandatory subjects" concerning "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment."' 2 1 Because it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees" with respect to such mandatory subjects, 2 2 the determination
of whether a subject should be classified as mandatory or non-mandatory (i.e.,
permissive) - a role that has been assumed by the NLRB in the first instance has significant consequences for the bargaining parties.
In the seminal case NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., Wooster Division, the
Supreme Court reviewed Sections 158(a)(5) and 158(d) of the NLRA and
created the distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining
subjects. 2 3 The Court held that the duty to bargain is limited to "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment."' 24 "As to other matters (i.e.,
permissive subjects of bargaining).., each party is free to bargain or not to
bargain, and to agree or not to agree." 25 That being said, while "decisions
'primarily about the conditions of employment'' are mandatory subjects of
bargaining, "entrepreneurial judgments 'fundamental to the basic direction of
a corporate enterprise"' are not within the scope of the bargaining
obligation.26
18. "Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of employees to
self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace. Refusal to confer and negotiate has
been one of the most prolific causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor
disturbances that it is a proper subject ofjudicial notice and requires no citation of instances." NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937).
19. ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 826
(John E. Higgins, Jr. ed., BNA Books, 5th ed., vol. I, 2006).

20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2008).
21. Id. § 159(a).
22. Id. § 158(a)(5).
23. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., Wooster Div., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
24. Id. at 349.
25. Id.
26. Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(quoting United Auto Workers v. NLRB, 470 U.S.422, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). See also Fibreboard
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In 1989, the NLRB held in Johnson-Bateman Co. 27 that the drug testing of
current employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining because it
substantially alters their terms and conditions of employment. 28 In reaching
this conclusion, the NLRB applied the two-part test set forth by the Supreme
Court in FordMotor Co. v. NLRB 2 9 and reasoned that mandatory drug testing
programs are compulsory subjects of bargaining because the implementation
of such programs is (1) "germane to the working environment" and (2) "not
among those 'managerial decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control." '' 30 Consequently, in the absence of a union waiver, a unionized
employer in the private sector has a legal obligation to bargain with the union
before drug testing bargaining-unit employees. MLB is not exempt from this
legal requirement and therefore must bargain over the implementation and
3
modification of a drug testing program for its Major League players. 1
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that there
was no duty "to bargain collectively regarding ...managerial decisions, which lie at the core of
entrepreneurial control" and "management decisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of a
corporate enterprise ...
should be excluded from [the duty of collective bargaining]").
27. Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180 (1989) (involving an employer's unilateral
implementation of a drug testing requirement of all employees who suffer workplace injuries
requiring medical treatment).
28. The NLRB explained that the drug testing of current employees "is a condition of
employment because it has the potential to affect the continued employment of individuals who
become subject to it." Id. at 183. In contrast, the drug testing of job applicants is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining. See Star Tribune & Newspaper Guild of the Twin Cities, Local 2, 295
N.L.R.B. 543 (1989) (an employer has no duty to bargain before testing job applicants because such
duty extends only to terms and conditions of "employment" and job applicants are not considered
"employees" under the NLRA).
29. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
30. Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. at 182.
31. "[D]rug testing is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining with the MLBPA .... [T~he
system of collective bargaining created by the National Labor Relations Act is, by design, an
incremental process. The law creates a framework for mandatory negotiation, but no outside party or
governmental agency has the authority to dictate a substantive result. Because the process is
essentially consensual, the agreements that emerge necessarily reflect a balancing of different
interests and are often not as forceful as those that can be produced by a different process or in a
different legal framework." Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: Evaluating Major League
Baseball's Efforts to EradicateSteroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Gov 't Reform, 109th
Cong. (2005) (statement of Robert D. Manfred, Jr., Executive Vice President, Major League
Baseball), available at http://oversight.house.gov/features/steroids/march 17_hearing-testimony.htm.
See also Glenn M. Wong & Richard J. Ensor, Major League Baseball and Drugs:Fight the Problem
or the Player?, 11 NOVA L. REV. 779, 805-09 (1987) (citing In the Matter of the Arbitration Between
Major League BaseballPlayerRelations Committee andMajor League BaseballPlayersAssociation,
Decision No. 69, Gr. Mo. 86-1, July 30, 1986, which held that drug testing provisions in player
contracts must be bargained with the Players Association). However, with respect to the minor
league players, who are not represented by a union, the Office of the Commissioner was able to
unilaterally implement a drug treatment and prevention program that covered performance enhancing
substances and promptly did so in 2001. See MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 4, at SR-12, 44-46.
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Just as a refusal to bargain in good faith over a mandatory subject of
bargaining is a violation of the NLRA, an employer commits an unfair labor
practice by unilaterally changing the terms of an already-existing agreement
concerning a mandatory subject. 32 Therefore, MLB cannot take unilateral
action with respect to modifying the terms of the Joint Drug Program - the
participation and consent of the Players Association is required. Only after the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, if good faith bargaining
were to result in an impasse, 33 could MLB then unilaterally modify the terms
34
of the Joint Drug Program to mirror its last offer proposal.
In the NLRA context, Senator Mitchell's model of complete third party
independence in formulating and modifying the terms of the Joint Drug
Program cannot be achieved. First, as a practical matter, any agreement to
have a third party independently set the terms of the Joint Drug Program
would have to include a "clear and unmistakable" waiver by the Players
Association and the Clubs of their right to bargain over changes to such
mandatory terms. 35 Moreover, even in the unlikely event that such a waiver
could be obtained, an agreement to have such complete third party
independence would be illusory because that very agreement itself would be
subject to renegotiation each time the term of the Joint Drug Program expires.
Indeed, like interest arbitration clauses, which also provide for the delegation
32. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
33. The Supreme Court has defined impasse as "a temporary deadlock or hiatus in negotiations."
Charles D. Bonnano Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982). Similarly, the NLRB has
defined impasse as "the point in time of negotiations when the parties are warranted in assuming that
further bargaining would be futile . . . . 'Both parties must believe that they are at the end of their
rope."' A.M.F. Bowling Co., 314 N.L.R.B. 969, 978 (1994), enforcement denied, 63 F.3d 1293 (4th
Cir. 1995) (quoting PRC Recording Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 615, 635 (1986), enforcing 836 F.2d 289 (7th
Cir. 1987)). The question of impasse is a factual one concerning the totality of the circumstances, and
the NLRB has established five factors, none of which are dispositive, to analyze whether parties have
reached an impasse. The NLRB may consider "[t]he bargaining history, the good faith of the parties
in negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues [over] which there
is disagreement, [and] the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of
negotiations." Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967). Accordingly, there is "no fixed
definition of an impasse or deadlock which can be applied mechanically to all factual situations." Id.
at 482.
34. Unilateral changes implemented after impasse must "not [be] substantially different or
greater than any [offers] which the employer has proposed during its negotiations." Loral Defense
Sys.-Akron v. NLRB, 200 F.3d 436, 449 (6th Cir. 1999), enforcing 320 N.L.R.B. 755 (1996).
35. Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. at 184. In order for a union to waive'its statutory right
to bargain over a mandatory subject, it must receive timely notice of an employer's intention to
change a term or condition of employment and fail to promptly request bargaining. Additionally, a
union may expressly waive this statutory right by agreeing to a contractual provision or practice that
grants the employer the authority to take unilateral action with regard to said mandatory subject.
Dennis J. Morkawa et al., Implementation of Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Unionized Workplace,
11 NOVA L. REV. 653, 660-61 (1987).
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of decision-making authority to a third party for the determination of specific
collective bargaining issues, 36 an independent third party administrator could
never assume absolute or exclusive authority over the Joint Drug Program
because "interest arbitration clauses are not enforceable to 'perpetuate the
inclusion of the [interest arbitration] clause in successive bargaining
agreements.' 37 Accordingly, the Joint Drug Program can never be "truly
independent" in the sense of formulating and modifying its terms because
federal labor law will always demand that the Parties return to the bargaining
38
table.
There should be no dispute that the elimination of the use of performance
enhancing substances in sports is an important goal. But, the NLRA requires
that employers and unions bargain over mandatory subjects of bargaining,
irrespective of how important the subject may be for the employer, its
employees, or third-parties. By way of example, the NLRB rejected the claim
of an employer that it was not required to bargain over a change in procedures
that it claimed were necessary to reduce the threat of a nuclear accident, and
rejected the claim of another employer that it was permitted to act unilaterally
to respond to a safety issue presented by security guards carrying guns at
work. 39 The policy judgment reflected in the NLRA is that, over time, the
collective bargaining process will produce the best solutions, even on
36. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 19, at 1378 (explaining that the purpose of
interest arbitration clauses is to resolve deadlocked bargaining issues through arbitration).
37. Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 545 v. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084, 1089 n.3, reh 'g
denied en banc (8th Cir. 2004).
38. Indeed, under the NLRA, the Parties could not agree to indefinitely delegate responsibility
for modifying the Joint Drug Program to a third-party. The NLRB has long held that a contract term
of indefinite duration "will be interpreted as intending performance for a reasonable time." Boeing
Airplane Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 447 (1948), enforcement denied on other grounds, 174 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir.
1949). Even if the Parties did purport to agree to delegate responsibility for the Program to a thirdparty, either Party would have the right under federal labor law to request bargaining on the subject
after a reasonable period of time. See McArdle Desco Corp., 4-CA-20660, 1992 WL 414992, at *4
(N.L.R.B.G.C. Aug. 28, 1992) ("the principle established in Boeing-that clauses calling for
perpetual adherence to a contract's terms become contracts of indefinite duration which are
terminable by either party after a reasonable period--continues to be valid"); Air Systems
Engineering, Inc., 19-CA-16790, 1984 WL 47364, at *2 (N.L.R.B.G.C. Sept. 28, 1984).
39. See E.G. & G. Rocky Flats, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 489, 492-93 (1994) (where employer
discontinued contractually-prescribed training procedures in order to reduce the threat of a nuclear
accident by alleviating the shortage of qualified and experienced employees, noting that the
"operation of a nuclear weapons facility presents unique safety concerns which must be carefully
considered," but nonetheless concluding that the employer "failed to establish that any particularized
exigent threat to safety existed at [its] facility which would have justified the [employer's] unilateral
action"); Northside Center for Child Development, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 105, 105 (1993)
(acknowledging the "emergency circumstances" presented by the employer's legitimate safety
concern over security guards' on-site possession of guns, but concluding that those concerns did not
excuse the employer from bargaining).
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important issues, and will minimize the overarching problem of industrial
strife.
Unlike achieving complete independence in formulating and modifying
the terms of the Joint Drug Program, however, achieving administrative
independence - that is, for example, in scheduling tests and reporting results,
monitoring collection procedures, and determining eligibility for therapeutic
use exemptions - is a practical and attainable goal through collective
bargaining. Indeed, in the latest round of negotiations, both Parties recognized
the need to achieve administrative independence of the Joint Drug Program to
the greatest extent possible and, as is explained in Part III, were able to do so.

III.

THE

2008 MODIFICATIONS TO THE JOINT DRUG PROGRAM AND THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE INDEPENDENCE

Senator Mitchell rightly reported that it was a "critical necessity" for
"everyone in baseball to work together to devise and implement the strongest
possible strategy to combat the illegal use of performance enhancing
substances, including the recommendations set forth in [his] report."'40 To this
end, although MLB and the Players Association were under no legal
obligation to modify the Joint Drug Program during its term, and despite the
obstacles posed by federal labor law, the Parties reopened and formally
amended the Joint Drug Program for the third time in as many years. 4 1 In
fact, MLB unilaterally made improvements outside the Joint Drug Program
40. MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 4, at 307.
41. January 2005 was the first occasion in which the Parties amended the Joint Drug Program
mid-term. The Parties agreed to greater frequency of testing for performance enhancing substances
and more stringent penalties for positive test results. Under the January 2005 agreement, a player's
first positive test would merit a ten-day suspension without pay, while second, third, and fourth
positive tests would result in thirty-day, sixty-day, and one year suspensions without pay,
respectively. In addition, human growth hormone and seventeen other compounds were added to the
list of performance enhancing substances. Press Release, Major League Baseball, MLB and Players
Association Reach Tentative Agreement on New Steroids Policy (Jan. 13, 2005), http://mlbplayers.
mlb.com/pa/news/article.jsp?ymd=2005031 I&contentid=964769&vkey=mlbpa.news&fext=.jsp.
November 2005 marked the second occasion in which the Parties amended the Joint Drug Program.
The Parties agreed to further increase the frequency of testing and instituted significantly increased
penalties for positive test results for performance enhancing substances. Under this new agreement,
players testing positive for steroids and similar substances became subject to a fifty-game suspension
for a first positive test, a hundred-game suspension for a second positive test, and a lifetime ban for a
third positive test. In addition, amphetamines were re-categorized as performance enhancing
substances. The first time a player tested positive for an amphetamine, he would be subject to
mandatory follow-up testing. Players who tested positive for amphetamines a second and third time
became subject to twenty-five-game and eighty-game suspensions, respectively. A fourth positive
test for amphetamines would result in a lifetime ban. Press Release, Major League Baseball, MLB,
MLBPA Announce New Drug Agreement (Nov. 15, 2005), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/press releases/
press.release.jsp?ymd=20051115&content id=1268552&vkey=pr__mlb&fext=-.jsp&c-id--mlb.
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where it was legally able to do so, 42 and the Parties worked together to
respond to the remainder of Senator Mitchell's recommendations to strengthen
the Joint Drug Program. 43 The current version of the Joint Drug Program
reflects significant strides in the area of administrative independence and now
more closely resembles Senator Mitchell's vision than ever before.
In the latest modifications to the Joint Drug Program, the Parties
disbanded the Health Policy Advisory Committee, which was comprised of
management and union officials, and delegated its previous responsibilities for
the administration of the Joint Drug Program to an independent third party
having "no affiliation with the Commissioner's Office, any Major League
Club or the [Players] Association." 44 Specifically, the Parties appointed Dr.
Bryan Smith 45 to serve as the Independent Program Administrator (IPA) for
an initial term of three years. 46 Dr. Smith's appointment is renewable for
successive four-year terms unless "[e]ither Party may remove the Independent
Program Administrator by serving written notice on [him]."' 47 Interestingly, in
an effort to make the administrative delegation as "permanent" as possible, the
bargaining parties avoided making the term of the IPA coterminous with the
Basic Agreement, thus allowing the Joint Drug Program to continue to operate
48
independently during the renegotiation of the Parties' economic agreement.

42. See Major League Baseball Acts on Mitchell Recommendations, supra note 6.
43. Barry M. Bloom, MLB, Union Formalize New Drug Policy, MLB.COM, Apr. 11, 2008,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=2008041 l&contentid=2515782&vkey=newsmlb&fext-.j
sp&cid-mlb; See also Recommendations from the Mitchell Commission Report, ESPN.COM, Dec.
13, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3153754 (summarizing all of Senator
Mitchell's recommendations).
44. Major League Baseball, Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, § l(A)(1)(a) (2008);
Press Release, Major League Baseball, Major League Baseball and Players Association Modify Joint
Drug Agreement (Apr. 11, 2008), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/press-releases/press-release.jsp?ymd=
20080411 &contentid=2515749&vkey=pr mlb&fext=-.jsp. See id. (summarizing the major changes
to the Joint Drug Program).
45. Dr. Smith is the former head team physician at the University of North Carolina (UNC),
where he also served as director of UNC's drug testing program. Accordingly, Dr. Smith has
experience both working with athletes and administering a drug testing program. Dr. Smith earned
his medical degree from Duke University and holds a doctorate in exercise physiology from Michigan
State University. Dr. Smith did his residency in pediatrics at UNC and then completed a sports
medicine fellowship program at the University of California at Los Angeles. A.J. Perez, MLB DrugTester Drawing IncreasedScrutiny, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.
comsports/baseball/2008-02-12-drug-testerN.htm.
46. Major League Baseball and Players Association Modify Joint Drug Agreement, supra note
44.
47. Major League Baseball, Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, § I (B)(I) (2006).
48. Compare Basic Agreement Between The 30 Major League Clubs And Major League
Baseball Players Association, Article XXVI (effective Dec. 20, 2006) with Major League Baseball,
Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, § I(A)(l)(b) (2008).
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Under the new agreement, the IPA can only be removed during his term
"for acting in a manner inconsistent with the Program or for misconduct that
affects his ability to perform as IPA. ' 49 If the Parties serve the IPA with
written notice of their intention to remove him, an arbitration hearing will
"determine whether grounds exist for [his removal]."' 50 Should the Arbitration
Panel decide to remove the IPA and the Parties are unable to select a successor
within thirty days, the Panel Chair is authorized to appoint a new IPA after
consulting with the Parties. 51
The IPA's duties and responsibilities under the Joint Drug Program are
broad and comprehensive as they include:
(1) administering testing requirements, from the scheduling of the
collection of specimens to the reporting of test results to the Parties;
(2) monitoring, maintaining and supervising the collection procedures,
laboratory analysis and testing protocols;
(3) auditing results of the Joint Drug Program and reviewing all aspects of
its operation, including the performance of the specimen collectors
and the testing laboratory;
(4) communicating with the collectors and laboratory regarding the
collection, transmission and analysis of urine samples;
(5) administering the "Therapeutic Use Exemption" process by which it is
determined whether a player has a valid, medically appropriate
prescription to use an otherwise prohibited substance;
(6) developing, in consultation with the Parties, education programs
supporting the objectives of the Joint Drug Program;
(7) preparing and publicly releasing an annual report that sets forth the
number of tests conducted, the number of adverse analytical findings
reported by the laboratory that resulted in discipline, the substances
involved in the adverse analytical findings that resulted in discipline,
the number of non-analytical positives that resulted in discipline, and
the number of Therapeutic Use Exemptions broken down by category
of medication (ADD/ADHD, hypertension, etc.);
(8) preparing and publicly releasing a report at the conclusion of each
term that sets forth the total number of in-season tests and off-season
tests conducted during that term; and
(9) taking any and all other reasonable actions necessary to ensure the
proper administration of the Joint Drug Program and confidentiality of

49. Major League Baseball, Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, § I(A)(1)(c) (2008).
50. Id. § l(A)(1)(d).
51. See id. § l(A)(1)(e).
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its records. 52
As evidenced by these recent changes, the Joint Drug Program is now
independently administered. However, due to the constraints of the NLRA,
the formulation and modification of the Joint Drug Program remains a
mandatory subject of bargaining, and the Clubs and Players Association are
required by federal law to collectively bargain its terms, such as the list of
prohibited substances and the penalties imposed on players. That being said,
the improved Joint Drug Program does provide for an annual review process
whereby "the Parties will meet with the IPA, the Medical Testing Officer, and
a representative from [the Joint Drug Program's specimen collection
company] 53 regarding potential changes to the Program based on
developments during the most recent year." 54 The Parties are required to meet
and confer on any recommendations or suggestions offered with the purpose
of trying to reach an agreement on their implementation. 55 The procedures
assure serious, annual independent input on the structure of the Joint Drug
Program. In addition, any controlled substances added by the federal
government to its list of controlled substances in Schedules I, II, or 11156 are
automaticallyadded to the list of Prohibited Substances. 57 At any time during
the term of the Joint Drug Program, the Parties may agree to add additional
58
substances to the list of Prohibited Substances.
IV. CONCLUSION

By improving the Joint Drug Program in the variety of ways discussed
above, MLB and the Players Association have made every effort to fulfill
Senator Mitchell's recommendation of a completely independent drug testing
program consistent with the important policies underlying the NLRA.
Although, as a practical matter, there must be shared authority with the Players
Association over the formulation and modification of the Joint Drug
Program's terms, baseball is the only major professional sport in the United
52. Id. §§ l(A)(2), 3(G).
53. "The Director of the Montreal Lab shall be the Medical Testing Officer and shall conduct all
of the testing of Player samples collected." Id. § I(E). The "Montreal Lab" is the WADA-certified
laboratory known as the Laboratoire de Controle du Dopage (IRNS - Institut Armand-Frappier) in
Montreal, Quebec, Canada. Id. § I(D). Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. collects urine samples and
is "responsible for the transport of such specimens" under the Joint Drug Program. Id. § I(C).
54. Id. § I(F).
55. Id.
56. See Schedules of Controlled Substances, 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11-1308.13 (2008).
57. Major League Baseball, Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program,
(2008)(emphasis added).
58. Id.; see generally § 2 (showing the full list of "Prohibited Substances").
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States that has an independently administered drug testing program. Indeed,
the Joint Drug Program is more closely aligned with Senator Mitchell's
recommendation than any of the drug testing programs utilized by the other
three major professional sports leagues. At the present time, no other major
professional sports league has achieved administrative independence and each
of their drug testing programs continues to be59"jointly controlled by the
leagues and their respective players associations."
Baseball has moved past the so-called "steroids era" 60 and the sport has
never been more popular: attendance records continue to be set on an annual
basis and revenues are at an all-time high. 6 1 The Mitchell Report was "a call
to action," 62 which played an important role in helping the sport move
forward, and provided substantial guidance to the Parties in restructuring the
Joint Drug Program. Still, the Joint Drug Program is a fluid document and
continuing challenges, such as overcoming the inability to test for human
growth hormone, remain. 63 Certainly, as explained by Senator Mitchell, MLB
will need to face and overcome new and unforeseen issues that will inevitably
64
arise.
The battle to eradicate performance enhancing substances in sports is an
ongoing effort, and federal labor law makes the effort more complicated for
59. MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 4, at 263. See National Football League Policy on Anabolic
Steroids and Related Substances (2007); Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Hockey
League and National Hockey League Players Association, Art. 47 (2005); National Basketball Players
Association Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. 33 (1999).
60. Senator Mitchell found that baseball's testing program has been "effective in that detectable
steroid use appears to have declined." MITCHELL REPORT, supranote 4, at 310. Commissioner Selig
has said that he is "happy in a great sense that we've cleaned the sport up and we don't have to
continue talking about things. The reason we're having an extraordinary year is that we're not talking
about steroids anymore. When you think of everything that's been done, we're down to two or three
positive tests for steroids and we've banned amphetamines." Rick Hummel, Bud Selig - MLB
Commissioner- That Was Then, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 7, 2008, at D9.
61. Forbes reported that in 2007 Major League Baseball set an attendance record for the fourth
consecutive season, as 79.5 million fans "hit the turnstiles." In addition, the sport's annual revenue
increased to $5.5 billion, a 7.7% gain from the previous season. Michael K. Ozanian & Kurt
Badenhausen, Special Report: The Business of Baseball, FORBES, Apr. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/16/baseball-team-values-biz-sports-baseball08-cx-mo-kb0416
baseballintro.html. Commissioner Selig confirmed such findings, as he stated that he is "proud to say
Baseball has never been more popular. Our attendance continues to break records, year after year,
and our fans continue to love the game." Commissioner's Statement, supra note 3.
62. Commissioner's Statement, supra note 3.
63. Human growth hormone is undetectable in a urine test. Major League Baseball, along with
the National Football League, is funding Dr. Don Catlin in his efforts to find a valid urine test for
Human Growth Hormone (HGH). Id. For an interesting discussion about the challenges posed by
efforts to test for HGH and doubts concerning the reliability of blood testing for the substance, see
Richard H. McLaren, WADA Drug Testing Standards, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 1, 18-19 (2007).
64. MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 4, at 258.
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unionized professional sports leagues, which are required to collectively
bargain over improvements to their drug testing programs. Today, MLB's
Joint Drug Program is more comprehensive and independent than ever
before. 65 Indeed, it is "the most aggressive drug program in professional
sports," 66 and its penalties for failed drug tests are "the strongest of any major
professional sports league in the United States." 67 These facts suggest that the
system of free collective bargaining has proven capable of addressing this
difficult problem. That being said, Major League Baseball will continue to be
diligent, support research, education and, to the extent not restricted by federal
labor law, do whatever may be necessary to strengthen the Joint Drug Program
68
and protect the integrity of the game.

65. Commissioner Selig has explained that "[b]aseball already has the toughest penalties in
professional sports and our testing program will now be more rigorous and independent than ever."
Press Release, Major League Baseball, Joint Drug Agreement Addresses Mitchell Recommendations
(Apr. 11, 2008), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/press-releases/press-release.jsp?ymd=2008041 l&content_
id=2515767&vkey=pr..mlb&fext=.jsp&cid--milb.
66. Commissioner's Statement, supra note 3.
67. MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 4, at 304; see also id. at 276-77.
68. Commissioner Selig stated, "[a]s we implement the Senator's recommendations, we will do
even more. We will not rest. Major League Baseball remains committed to this cause and to the
effort to eliminate the use of performance-enhancing substances from the game." Commissioner's
Statement, supra note 3. Selig further stated, "I will continue to take every step necessary to protect
the integrity of this game." Joint Drug Agreement Addresses Mitchell Recommendations, supra note
65.

